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Abstract
In questo saggio analizziamo il comportamento delle entrate fiscali in presenza di
corruzione diffusa sia in un contesto statico che dinamico. Noi proviamo che la relazione
tra aliquota ed entrate fiscali e` non lineare: in un contesto statico si e` evidenziata una
sorta di curva di Laffer. Una maggiore aliquota fiscale, via maggiore corruzione, puo`
ridurre le entrate. In un contesto dinamico tale relazione e` inversa: le entrate sono alte
per aliquote fiscali basse ed alte, mentre sono basse per livelli intermedi dell’aliquota.
Inoltre noi dimostriamo che anche la relazione tra aliquota fiscale e crescita economica e`
non lineare.
Abstract
In this paper we explore tax revenue in a regime of widespread corruption in a static
and dynamic framework. We prove that the relationship between tax rate and tax col-
lection is not linear. In a static context, this may bring about a Laffer–like behavior of
overall tax revenue. A higher tax rate, via higher corruption, may reduce revenues. In a
dynamic context, this relationship is inverted: tax revenues are high for low and high tax
rates, while low for intermediate tax rates. Furthermore we prove that the relationship
between the tax rate and growth is not linear. [JEL Code: H21 H26 D73]
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1 Introduction
Tax evasion is a serious problem, not only in transition economies, but also in countries with
developed tax systems. An important aspect of the work of the tax authority is dealing with
the possibility of corruption. Dishonest taxpayers who under–report their income may bribe
inspectors. It is widely agreed that the presence of tax evasion and corruption of public
officials, are social phenomena, whose pervasive effect can significantly reduce tax revenue,
and seriously hurt economic growth (Rose - Akerman, 1975,1978; Shleifer and Vishny 1993
etc.). Therefore, in determining its auditing strategy, the tax authority should take into
account, the possibility of its inspectors being corrupted. Although an extensive literature
has investigated the origins, effects, and size on both theoretical, and empirical aspects, the
interaction between tax evasion and corruption, has been only partially explored. In fact it is
only recently that this relationship has been investigated in literature. Generally, corruption
and evasion are two phenomena, which can exist independently. Even if a certain percentage
of tax evasion is much more anonymous, and does not entail the corruption of government
officials, our model, analyses chiefly, but not only,1 tax evasion through the corruption of tax
officials. Furthermore, since bribery agreements can dilute deterrence of underlying violation,
it is desirable for society, to detect, and weed out corruption, in order to preserve a given
degree of deterrence.
In the pioneering model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the relationship between tax
rates and evasion is ambiguous, and depends on the third derivative of the utility function.
A broader review of the literature, reports that, more generally, theoretical predictions of
the effect of tax rates on evasion are, dependent on modeling assumptions (Slemrod and
Yitzhaki, 2000). Fisman and Wei (2000) present a case study of tax evasion in China: they
find that on average, a 1 percent increase in the tax rate, results in a 3 percent increase in
evasion, and furthermore, this relationship is not linear: the evasion elasticity is larger at a
high tax rate.
Chander and Wilde (1992) take into account the possibility of collusion between a tax
evader and an official auditor, whose cost of dishonesty is (relatively) low. In Besley and
McLaren (1993), Hindriks et al. (1999), and Mookherjee and Png (1995), dealing with the
issue of optimal remuneration of the inspectors. Besley and McLaren (1993) compare three
distinct remuneration schemes, which provide different incentives to the inspectors: efficiency
wages, reservation wages, and capitulation wages. They characterize the conditions under
which each scheme generates the greatest amount of tax revenues, net of administration
costs. They show that the efficiency wage strategy may not be a good idea most of the
time. In our model, we not consider the issue of optimal remuneration of the inspectors, by
assuming, that the inspector is paid a fixed wage. Hindriks et al. (1999), consider a model
where all the actors are dishonest. They allow, however, for general remuneration schemes,
and more importantly, for extortion. They show that in addition to loss in tax collection,
the more bribes are collected, the more a tax inspector can resort to extortion in order to
collect even more. In this case, the authors show that distributional effects of evasion and
corruption, are regressive, because the richest taxpayers have most to gain from evading
taxes, and are least vulnerable to extortion, (as it is harder to credibly over–report their
1See paragraph 3.1.
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income). Finally, Mookherjee and Pngs (1995),in their paper, also consider only corruptible
agents but they remove the exogenous matching of the auditor and the evader, (polluter in
their case), often–assumed in literature. They consider it a moral hazard problem, since, for
evasion to be disclosed, the inspector has to exert a costly non–observable effort.
All the models described, analyze the relationship between tax revenues and tax rate,
only in a static context,2 and some of them (see Chander and Wilde, 1992 and Sanyal et al.,
2000) show, as in our model, that the possibility may exist that an increase in the tax rate
or the fine rate could actually decrease government revenue.
The present paper provides a theoretical study of the problem of the optimal tax rate, in
the presence of corruption in a static and dynamic context. When bureaucracy is corrupt, a
rise in tax rates starts off complicated strategic moves, by both taxpayers and inspectors. In
fact, in a corrupt administration, a higher tax rate, presents the possibility of a higher
negotiated bribe rate, and may also increase the number of corrupt tax inspectors, by
overcoming moral cost, while for the taxpayers a higher tax rate creates a greater incentive
to pay bribes. In our model we endogenize the output production, analyzing the relationship
between tax rate, and tax revenues, in a dynamic framework, and we prove that the
relationship between tax rate, and tax collection, is not linear, and is very different in a
static or dynamic context. In particular, in a static model, after a certain point, increases
in the tax rate, lead to a drop in tax revenue, generating a Laffer–curve even in absence of
distortions regarding input provision. In a dynamic context the relationship between the tax
rate, and dynamic tax collection is not only non–linear, but is also inverted when compared
with the static one. Therefore, an increase in the tax rate generates initially, lower revenues,
which increase as the tax rate increases above a certain threshold. In this case, also, the
relationship between the tax rate and growth, is not linear: at a low level of tax rate an
increase in it leads to a lower growth rate; after a certain threshold, increases in the tax rate
lead to an increase in economic growth. As, in the long term, fiscal revenues depend on the
rate of capital accumulation, we will have a situation where tax revenues will go hand in
hand with the growth rate.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we first present the model and then we
formalize, and solve the game, describing the model in a static framework. In Section 3
we extend the analysis in a dynamic context, endogenizing output, and we demonstrate the
non–linear relationship between the tax rate, and dynamic tax revenues, and between tax
rates, and growth. In Section 4 we discuss policy considerations. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
Consider an economy producing a single homogeneous good y. The economy is composed of
three types of agents: a monitoring agency (monitors), a population of public officials (tax
inspectors), and a population of taxpayers (entrepreneurs). Tax inspectors cannot invest in
the production activity, and earn a fixed salary w, while entrepreneurs use their available
capital in the productive sector. There is a continuum of tax inspectors and entrepreneurs,
and their number is normalized to 1 for both categories. The State monitors entrepreneurs’
2Sanyal A. et al. (2000), e. g., evidence that, in their model, the outcome stems from redistribution of
income among taxpayers, auditors and the government, at a given aggregate income level.
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and tax inspectors’ behavior through monitors, in order to weed out or reduce corruption,
and fix the level of the tax rate t on the product y. The State uses its tax revenues for pay
the tax inspector’s wages, and there is no space for financing public productive expenditure.
We assume that taxation is not distorsive regarding input provision. Economic agents are
risk-neutral.
Firms, manufacture the homogeneous product y, with technology with constant returns
to scale. Each entrepreneur is assumed below to have the same quantity of capital k. The
product may be either manufactured for consumption purposes c or for investment purposes.
The production function of the good only depends on the capital and the natural state
that may occur. In fact with a probability (1− δ) production will be :
(1) y = ak
while with a probability δ an adverse natural state will occur and production will not take
place:
(2) y = 0
Profits are taxed at a tax rate t. A tax inspector, who checks that tax payment is correct,
monitors each entrepreneur. The tax inspector is able to tell which of the two natural states
have occurred for each entrepreneur, only after controlling. It is common knowledge that
the tax inspector3 is corruptible, in the sense that he pursues his own interest, and not
necessarily that of the State; in particular, the tax inspector is open to bribery. The tax
inspector, in the case of the “good” natural state and in exchange for a bribe b, can offer
the entrepreneur the opportunity of reporting to the State, that the natural state that has
arisen is the “bad” one.
Let bd be the bribe asked by the tax inspector. Then, the entrepreneur could refuse
payment of the bribe, or accept to pay the bribe negotiating the bribe with the inspector.
The State checks on the behavior of entrepreneurs and tax inspectors. Let q ∈ [0, 1]
be the monitoring level implemented by the State. There is an exogenous probability q of
being detected, given that corruption has taken place. The entrepreneurs incur a cost– for
the social stigma associated with being found guilty – equal to ck where c ∈ [0, 1].4 The
entrepreneur, if detected, must pay taxes ty, moral cost, but he is refunded the cost of the
bribe, paid to the tax inspector5.
3The inspector is assumed to have monopolistic power, meaning that an entrepreneur is seen by only one
inspector and cannot turn to other inspectors, to get a different treatment.
4The punishment for the entrepreneur is not a constant, but rather a function of the investment. In
this case too, based on the statements of Rose - Ackerman S. (1999): “On the other side of the corrupt
transaction, a fixed penalty levied on bribers will lower both the demand for corrupt services and the level of
bribes. However, it will have no marginal impact once the briber passes the corruption threshold. To have a
marginal effect, the penalties imposed on bribe payers should be tied to their gains (their excess profits, for
example)”.pp. 55.
5This assumption can be more easily understood when, rather than corruption, there is extortion by the
tax inspector, even though, in many countries, the relevant provisions or laws, stipulate that the bribe shall in
any case, be returned to the entrepreneur, and that combined minor punishment, (penal and/or pecuniary),
be inflicted on him/her.
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2.1 The game: description and solution
Given the model just described, the economic problem can be formalized by the following
two-period dynamic game with perfect and complete information (see figure 1).
Figure 1: The game tree
At the outset of the game, Nature decides in which state the entrepreneurs find themselves
with their consequent level of activity.
(1) In the first stage of the game, the tax inspector checks the entrepreneurs’ production.
If a “bad” natural state occurs, then the tax inspector reports that no tax is owed,
and in this case, the game ends. Otherwise, if there is a “good” natural state, the tax
inspector decides whether to ask for the bribe bd (or not), or to report that the “bad”
natural state has arisen, and that the entrepreneur need not pay any tax.
(1.1) If bd = 0 no bribe is asked for, the payoff vector for the entrepreneurs and tax
inspectors is:
(3) pi2 = (ak(1− t), w)
The game ends in the equilibrium NC (No Corruption).
(1.2) Otherwise, let bd > 0 be the positive bribe asked for by the tax inspector. The
game continues to stage two.
(2) At stage two the entrepreneur decides whether to negotiate the bribe or turn it down.
(2.1) If the entrepreneur refuses the bribe, then the payoff vector is given by:
(4) pi3 = (ak(1− t), w)
Then, in this case the game ends. There is no penalty for the tax inspector.
(2.2) Otherwise the negotiation starts, and the two parties will find the bribe
corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining game (bNB) and the game ends.
This bribe is the outcome of a negotiation between the inspector and the entrepreneur,
who will be assumed to share in a given surplus. The payoffs will depend on whether
the inspector and the entrepreneur are detected, (with probability q) or not detected,
(with probability (1− q)). There is no penalty for the tax inspector detected.6
6The results do not depend on the existence of a cost for the tax inspector corrupted and detected. To
simplify the results, we have preferred to omit this.
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If the entrepreneur decides to pay the bribe, the expected payoff vector is given by:
(5) pi4 = (ak(1− qt)− ckq − (1− q)b, w + (1− q)b)
The game ends in the equilibrium C (Corruption).
In what follows, we refer to the entrepreneur payoff by a superscript (1), to the inspector
payoff by a superscript (2): they represent respectively the first and the second element of
the payoff vector pii, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
We first determine the equilibrium bribe (bNB) (see Appendix A for the proof).
Proposition 2.1. Let q 6= 1.7 Then there exists a unique non negative bribe (bNB), as the
Nash solution to a bargaining game, given by:
(6) bNB = µ
[
akt− qkc
(1− q)
]
.
where µ ≡ εε+β is the share of the surplus that goes to the tax inspector and β and ε are the
parameters that can be interpreted as the bargaining strength measures, of the entrepreneur
and the tax inspector respectively.
As a consequence of the model, let us assume that the tax inspector and the entrepreneur
share the surplus on an equal basis. This is the standard Nash case, when ε = β = 1 and
tax inspector and taxpayer get equal shares8. In this case the bribe is:
(7) bNB =
akt
2
− qkc
2(1− q) .
In other words, the bribe represents 50 percent of the saving coming from not paying taxes,
net of moral costs for the entrepreneur, if he is found out.
The payoff vector is given by:
(8) pi4 =
(
ak − akt(1 + q)
2
− ckq
2
, w +
akt(1− q)
2
− cqk
2
)
Comparative statics
(1) By analyzing this derivate we observe that:
(9)
∂bNB
∂t
=
ak
2
> 0
Therefore, increasing the tax rate, also increases the potential surplus that the tax
inspector and entrepreneur can share, and thus increasing the bribe;
7If q = 1 this stage of the game is never reached.
8The generalized (or asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution will be analyzed in paragraph 3.1. This
paragraph will also analyze the borderline case in which ε = 0, i.e.,where there is evasion without corruption.
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(2) And by analyzing:
(10)
∂bNB
∂q
= − kc
2(1− q)2 < 0
Therefore, increasing monitoring, reduces the potential surplus that the tax inspector
and entrepreneur can share, thus reducing the bribe.
By solving the static game, we can prove the following proposition:9
Proposition 2.2. Let 0 ≤ qca(1−q) = t∗ ≤ 1.10 Then,
(a) if t ∈ [0, t∗) the payoff vector is
(11) pi2 = (ak(1− t), w)
(b) if t ∈ [t∗, 1] the payoff vector is
(12) pi4 =
(
ak − akt(1 + q)
2
)− ckq
2
, w +
akt(1− q)
2
− cqk
2
)
.
Depending on the value of the tax rate t, two sub–game perfect Nash equilibria can be
found (see Table 1):
• If t < t∗ (equilibrium NC), what the entrepreneur obtains evading taxes, is not enough
to make up for the expected cost for the entrepreneur of risking detection. With this in
mind, the tax inspector will not ask the entrepreneur for a bribe. The game therefore,
finishes with the entrepreneur paying taxes. There is no sufficient margin for agreeing
on a positive bribe with the tax inspector.
• If t ≥ t∗ (equilibrium C), the entrepreneur finds it worthwhile to start a negotiation
with the tax inspector. Thus the surplus to be shared between the entrepreneur and
the inspector, will keep a negotiation going, whose outcome is the bribe corresponding
to the Nash solution to a bargaining game.
Therefore, in a given country, corruption arises when tax rates are sufficiently high.
2.2 Tax revenues with heterogeneous moral costs
In order to extend these considerations, we also analyze the solution of the game with respect
to moral cost c. If t ≥ t∗, then
c ≤ at(1− q)
q
= c∗
9See Appendix B for the proof.
10We are assuming that qc ≤ a(1 − q) that is, that the cost for corruption foreseen by the entrepreneur
is lower than the relevant benefits expected. Therefore if t = 1, pi4 > pi3 for all moral cost c and then all
entrepreneurs are corrupted. If t = 0, pi4 < pi3 for all moral cost c and then all entrepreneurs are honest.
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Table 1: Parameter conditions: the two Nash equilibria.
t value t < t∗ t ≥ t∗
Stage 1 The inspector does not The inspector
ask for a bribe asks for a bribe
Stage 2 The entrepreneur does not The entrepreneur
start a negotiation starts a negotiation
Equilibrium NC C
Corruption None Widespread
Resulting y = (1− δ)ak y = (1− δ)ak
output
Entrepreneur’s ak(1− t) ak
[
1− t(1+q)2
]
− ckq2
payoff
Inspector’s w w + akt(1−q)2 − cqk2
payoff
Tax revenues akt qakt
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If t < t∗, then
c >
at(1− q)
q
= c∗
If all entrepreneurs incur the same moral costs, this leads to a corner-solutions: in fact,
once a taxation level equal to t is set, if the moral cost is lower than c∗ = at(1−q)q , then all the
entrepreneurs will be corrupt at that level of taxation. If moral cost c is greater than c∗ then
all the entrepreneurs will be honest. Tax revenues depend on the hypothesis made on the
distributional cost. If moral cost is lower than c∗, the State will therefore receive revenues
(E(t)) that are equal to the taxes obtained if the corruption is detected (with probability q),
and if the positive natural state occur (with probability (1− δ)):
(13) E = (1− δ)akqt∗
Vice versa, if the entrepreneurs’ level of cost is greater than c∗ then all the entrepreneurs
will be honest, and the State will therefore have revenues equal to:
(14) E = ak(1− δ)t∗
Moral cost is equal for each entrepreneur is a convenient assumption, but non necessarily
a realistic one. Under this hypothesis, taxpayer optimization yields corner–solutions and
this is not an accurate description of taxpayers’ behavior. For this reason we introduce the
hypothesis that these costs may end up differently for the various entrepreneurs (let ci being
the entrepreneur i-cost), mirroring different ethical, moral and religious values or denoting
a greater or lesser sense of their own impunity.
The cumulative density of probability, defines the distribution of individual costs F (ci).
This function represents the proportion of entrepreneurs who agree to be corrupted when
the tax rate is t. If, as we will assume, the distribution of entrepreneurs’ costs is uniform in
the interval [cmin, cmax ], then the cumulative density of probability is linear:
(15) F (ci) =
∫ ci
cmin
1
cmax − cmindci =
ci − cmin
cmax − cmin
assume cmin = 0 and cmax = 1 from which the density function derived is:
(16) F (ci) = ci
Given the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs, we have that each their way of behaving will
be influenced by their own moral cost ci. On an aggregate level, the tax revenues is no
longer a corner solution. We have a situation where State revenues, with a tax rate fixed at
t, will be equal to the tax paid by those who find themselves in a positive natural state (with
probability (1 − δ)), and who have moral cost that induce them into being honest, and/or
those that are corrupt, but are discovered in the act of corruption:
(17) E(t) = atkα(1− δ) + atk(1− α)(1− δ)q
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where α =
[
1− ∫ c∗0 f(ci)dci], is the fraction of the entrepreneurs with moral costs that are
high enough to qualify them as honest and pay taxes. As we have already said, if moral
costs have a uniform distribution, then α = (1−c) = 1− at(1−q)q , out of which State revenues
become:11
E(t) = (1− δ)
[
atk(1− at(1− q)
q
) + atkq(
at(1− q)
q
)
]
=
(18) atk(1− δ)− a
2t2k(1− δ)(1− q)2
q
There is therefore a parabolic relationship between the tax rate t and the tax revenues
E(t). In particular, since a
2t2k(1−δ)(1−q)2
q < 0, the parabola is backward–bending. As we
can see in figure 2, an increase of the tax rate increases revenues up to t = q
2a(1−q)2 = t1,
after which an increase of the tax rate reduces revenues. Then this relationship in not linear:
for low tax rates an increase in the tax rate leads to an increase in revenues while, from a
certain threshold, an increase in the tax rate leads to a reduction in revenues. This Laffer–
curve is generally justified by the effect on factor supplies, resulting from the incentive of
higher post–tax income per unit of supply. In our model, this relationship instead, finds its
justification in widespread corruption that encourages entrepreneurs into evasion when the
tax rate increases.
Figure 2: Relationship between tax rate t and static revenues E(t)
Comparative statics
(1) By analyzing this derivate we observe that:
(19)
∂E(t)
∂t
= (1− δ)
[
ak − 2a
2tk(1− q)
q
+ 2a2tk(1− q)
]
Therefore, as the tax rate increases, revenues increases up to t = t1, after which an
increase of the tax rate reduces revenues. This happens as a result of the combination
of three effects:
1) As the tax rate increases, revenues increase, because those who are still honest pay
more taxes: (1− δ)ak > 0;
With an increase of the tax rate, the number of honest entrepreneurs decreases. This
leads to two effects:
11If t = 1, then all entrepreneurs are corrupt, and the tax revenues are paid only by those entrepreneurs
who have been found out: E(t = 1) = (1− δ)akq.
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2a) As the tax rate increases, revenues go down as the number of undiscovered
corrupt entrepreneurs increases and therefore the number of entrepreneurs paying tax
is reduced: −2a2k(1−q)(1−δ)q < 0;
2b) As the tax rate increases, revenues from those discovered in corrupt transactions
increase: 2a2k(1− q)(1− δ) > 0.
(2) And by analyzing:
(20)
∂E(t)
∂q
=
a2t2k(1− δ)(1− q2)
q2
> 0
This means that increasing monitoring reduces the potential surplus that the tax
inspector and the entrepreneur can share. Therefore corruption reduces and revenues
increase.
The existence of a Laffer–curve, thus, is justified by the presence of widespread corruption
in public administration. In such a static context, corruption only has a redistributive effect
(between taxpayers, tax inspector and government), while it causes lower revenues when
compared to the absence of corruption. The conclusions change radically if we pass from
static, to dynamic analysis, incorporating the negative effect (distortion) of taxation on
accumulation, and so on economic growth, and the repercussions this could have in terms of
fiscal revenues.
3 Dynamic Analysis
The game perspective is now expanded to review the dynamic consequences of tax rate
on dynamic revenues, on growth and, therefore, on investment, while analyzing the
entrepreneurs’ behavior in this respect.
As noted, a manufactured product y may be either consumed C or invested,
•
k.
Agents derive satisfaction from consumption according to a simple, constant elasticity
utility function:
(21) U =
C1−σ − 1
1− σ
Each entrepreneur maximizes utility over an infinite period of time, subject to a budget.
(22) max
c∈<+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(C)dt
sub
(23)
•
k = ΠI − C
where C is consumption, ρ is the discount rate in time, and ΠI is the return of investment
for entrepreneur.
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Since the return on the investment for the entrepreneur ΠI is different in each of the two
equilibria C (Corruption) and NC (No Corruption), the problem is solved for the two cases.
By solving the dynamic game, we can prove the following proposition:12
Proposition 3.1. Let at(1−q)q = c
∗. Then,
(a) if ci ≤ c∗ the growth rate is
(24) γCi =
1
σ
[
a− [at(1 + q)]
2
− qci
2
− ρ
]
(b) if ci > c∗ the growth rate is
(25) γNC =
1
σ
[a(1− t)− ρ].
Equilibrium depends therefore on individual moral cost except in the case in which t = 1
or t = 0. In fact, if t = 1, all entrepreneurs are corrupt and if t = 0 all entrepreneurs are
honest, irrespective of the moral cost.
• for a given tax rate t, the entrepreneurs with a moral cost of ci ≤ c∗, will find it
worthwhile to be corrupted, and so their optimal equilibrium will be corruption, C. In
such an equilibrium, the entrepreneur i–cost will experiment a growth rate of:
(26) γCi =
1
σ
[
a− [at(1 + q)]
2
− qci
2
− ρ
]
• for a given level of tax rate t, entrepreneurs with a moral cost of ci > c∗ will find
it worthwhile to be honest and their optimal equilibrium will be without corruption,
NC. In such an equilibrium, the entrepreneurs will obtain a growth rate of:
(27) γNC =
1
σ
[a(1− t)− ρ]
It may be further demonstrated that capital and income also have the same growth
rate of the consumption, and therefore equilibrium NC, from the dynamic viewpoint, is the
equilibrium that allows greater economic growth. In fact, at a steady state, everything
grows at the same rate and therefore
•
k
k is constant. At equilibrium C we know that•
k
k = a− at(1+q)2 − qci2 − Ck .
12See Appendix C for the proof.
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Since
•
k
k is constant, then the difference between both terms on the right should also be
constant, and because a, ci, q and t are constant, then C and k should grow at the same
rate. Similarly, since y = ak(1 − t), at a steady state, income grows at the same rate as
capital. The same applies in the case of equilibrium NC.
At the aggregate level, we will have a growth rate obtained by considering the different
growth rates for the corresponding entrepreneurs.
Thus in equilibrium C there will be (1−α) entrepreneurs, each with his own growth rate
γCi , in the equilibrium NC there will be (α) entrepreneurs, each with the same growth rate
γA.
At the aggregate level, we can prove the following proposition:13
Proposition 3.2. Let α = (1− c) = 1− at(1−q)q . Then,
(28) γy =
(1− δ)
σ
[
a2t2(1− q)2
4q
+ a(1− t)− ρ
]
There is therefore a parabolic relationship between the tax rate t and the rate of growth
γy. In particular, since
a2(1−q)2
4q > 0, the parabola is convex. In addition, the abscissa of the
vertex of this parabola is easily calculated:
(29) V =
2q
a(1− q)2 = t2 > 0
This relationship is represented in figure 3.
Figure 3: Relationship between tax rate and growth
We analyze now the corner–solutions:
• if t = 1, all entrepreneurs are corrupt and then the growth rate is:
(30) γy(t = 1) =
(1− δ)
σ
[
a(1− q)
2
− a
2(1− q)2
4q
− ρ
]
• if t = 0, all entrepreneurs are honest and then the growth rate is:
(31) γy(t = 0) =
1− δ
σ
[a− ρ]
13See Appendix D for the proof.
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Therefore the aggregate growth rate for t = 0 is greater than the growth rate for t = 1.
Comparative statics
(1) By computing this derivate we observe that:
(32)
∂γy
∂t
=
(1− δ)
σ
[
2a2t(1− q)2
4q
− a
]
we note that as the tax rate increases toward t = t2, growth declines. After the
threshold, as the tax rate increases, so growth begins to increase. This happens due to
the combination of three effects:
1) with an increase of the tax rate, the remaining number of honest individuals pay
more taxes and so accumulate less, depressing growth;
With an increase of the tax rate, the number of honest entrepreneurs increases. This
leads to two effects:
2a) growth increases inasmuch as the number of undiscovered corrupt entrepreneurs
increases. The corrupt entrepreneur now pays a bribe, and the bribe is lower than
the tax amount he would have paid if he had remained honest. A greater amount of
resources will be allocated to investment and generate higher growth;
2b) growth is reduced inasmuch as the number of discovered corrupt entrepreneurs
increases. The newly corrupt entrepreneur when discovered, (as he will be forced to
pay taxes but will receive the bribe back), is tantamount to an entrepreneur whose tax
burden has increased. The usual effect shown in 1) will apply.
(2) Also computing
(33)
∂γy
∂q
= −a
2t2(1− δ)(1− q2)
4σq2
< 0
We conclude that increasing monitoring activities, increases the amount of tax
collected, and therefore reduces accumulation and economic growth.
Therefore, on the growth of the tax rate t, the rate of growth in the economy initially
falls, only then to increase in growth, at a taxation point t > t2.
Initially, as the rate t grows, static revenue grows, and so growth also slows down meaning
that the entrepreneurs accumulate less. As the rate grows beyond a certain level, the higher
taxes paid by the honest, and by the corrupt who have been found out, are more than equaled
by the taxes not paid by corrupt entrepreneurs, whose number grows, as the tax rate rises.
Since the entrepreneurs evade tax insofar as the bribe paid is less than the amount of tax due
to the State, it follows that greater corruption implies less tax revenue and greater economic
growth, via greater accumulation.
Since the tax rate influences the accumulation of capital and, as a consequence, economic
growth, it will also increase fiscal revenues at steady state. In fact, if the static tax revenues
are:
13
(34) E(t) = atk(1− δ)− a
2t2k(1− δ)(1− q)2
q
In a steady state, everything grows at the same rate and therefore
•
k
k is constant. In
equilibrium, the rate of tax revenues, γE(t) should also be constant, and because a, δ, q
and t are constant, then E(t) and k should grow at the same rate. Thus, we have found
a non-linear relationship between the tax rate and dynamic revenues in a dynamic context
(see figure 4), which is however inverted when compared to the static context.
Lesser revenues today due to evasion can bring greater growth through greater capital
accumulation, and consequently greater revenues tomorrow. In the corner–solutions we can
see that:
• if t = 1, all entrepreneurs are corrupt, and then the revenues’ rate is:
(35) γE(t = 1) =
(1− δ)
σ
[
a(1− q)
2
− a
2(1− q)2
4q
− ρ
]
This happens inasmuch as if t = 1, all entrepreneurs are corrupt and then evade tax.
But with probability q, they are detected, and forced to pay taxes;
• if t = 0, all entrepreneurs are honest and then the revenues rate are:
(36) γE(t = 0) = 0
Figure 4: Relationship between dynamic tax rate and tax revenues
3.1 Bargaining strength
In an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, the surplus is shared unequally between the tax
inspector and the taxpayer, and the equilibrium bribe (bNB) is:
(37) bNB = µ
[
akt− qkc
(1− q)
]
.
where µ ≡ εε+β is the share of the surplus that goes to the tax inspector and β and ε
bargaining strength, respectively of the entrepreneur and the tax inspector.
Thus the bribe paid to the inspector, increases as the inspector’s bargaining strength
increases, expressed as ε. In fact, by computing this derivate we observe that:
(38)
∂bNB
∂µ
= akt− qkc
(1− q) > 0
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Increasing the bargaining power of the tax inspector increases the bribe that he can obtain.
In the model we also see that corruption does not depend on the distribution of the surplus
between the inspector and the tax evader, but only on the amount of the surplus τ . In fact,
(1 − α) = at(1−q)q is the number of entrepreneurs corrupted and it is not dependent on the
parameters β and ε. On the contrary, such parameters affect any rates of income–growth
and tax revenue, in that a different distribution of power in the area of bargaining, affects
accumulation by the entrepreneur, and hence the growth rate.
In particular, in the proposition 3.1, we see that if ci > c∗, the growth rate is:
(39) γNC =
1
σ
[a(1− t)− ρ]
and it is not dependent on the parameters β and ε. On the contrary, if ci ≤ c∗, the growth
rate is dependent on the parameters, β and ε in that this is the equilibrium where the
entrepreneur pays the bribe, and the value of this bribe depends on β and ε. The growth
rate, if ci ≤ c∗, will be:
(40) γCi =
1
σ
[a− at[q + (1− q)µ]− qci(1− µ)− ρ]
As a result, the aggregate growth rate will also be affected by the bargaining strength of the
inspector and the evader. In fact the growth rate will be:
(41) γy =
(1− δ)
σ
[
a2t2(1− µ)(1− q)2
2q
+ a(1− t)− ρ
]
As the inspector’s bargaining power increases, the economy’s growth rate will decrease
because fewer resources will be at the entrepreneur’s disposal for accumulation. In fact
by computing this derivate we observe that:
(42)
∂γy
∂µ
= −(1− δ)
σ
[
a2t2(1− q)2
2q
]
< 0
Then, if the taxpayer gets much of the evaded taxes, growth will surely suffer because fewer
resources will be given over to the process of accumulation.
The bargaining strength between the tax inspector and the taxpayer may be influenced by
other forces (or, variables), such as, the tactics employed by the bargainers, the procedure
through which negotiations are conducted, the information structure and the players’
discount rate. If, for example, the discount rate for the taxpayer were greater than the
tax inspector’s, this would give greater power to the inspector, as the entrepreneur would be
inclined to accept a smaller proportion of the surplus than the inspector would get, in order
not to pay taxes. Therefore, offering ε ad infinitum, the aggregate growth of income, and
of tax revenues, forms a parabola, that is more ”flattened” towards the bottom, as far as
parity of the other variables (a, q, ci, σ, δ, t) is concerned, the growth rate will be the lower,
the greater the bargaining power of the bureaucrat. Therefore, where there is corruption,
and therefore evasion, countries which have entrepreneurs with greater bargaining power,
will succeed in obtaining higher growth rates. If there is no corruption, but only evasion, i.e.
15
µ = 0, the inspector will not ask for a bribe, therefore the entire surplus deriving from the
evasion(τ), will be collected by the entrepreneur, and devolved to the process of accumulation
and growth. Also in this borderline case, it is the amount of the surplus that determines
the level of corruption. Whereas, the sharing of the said surplus, only modifies the dynamic
variables.
4 Policy consideration
In this section we use the results derived above to assess the normative implications of
our model of tax evasion, corruption and growth in a static and dynamic context. The
results of our model are certainly influenced by two important assumptions relating to the
behavior of the State. – No budget constraint is included and therefore several very concrete
requirements have been excluded, regarding those countries, which are obliged to adhere to
the agreement for stability and growth, and a well-balanced State budget.
– Public expenditure is non productive but is used exclusively for the inspectors’ wages. If
this were not so, greater fiscal income might lead to lower accumulation for the entrepreneur,
but to higher productive costs for the State. Therefore, an important issue might be, whether
private expenditure (entrepreneurs’ investments) is more productive than public spending.
Let us briefly summarize the findings obtained so far. Increases in the tax rate, change tax
revenues and the growth rate, at the same time, increasing corruption because the number
of entrepreneurs corrupted increases.
The State could choose to achieve different policy objectives in a static or dynamic
context. If the State is operating over the short term, its goals could to maximize static tax
revenues, aggregate income or eradicate corruption. In a static model, the tax rate does not
influence aggregate income, but revenues and the level of corruption. In fact we have shown
that if raising t to a threshold level increases tax revenue, corruption increases as the tax
rate increases. Therefore, the State could choose to achieve the following policy objectives:
maximize tax revenue, or weed out corruption.
In order to take into account, the level of well-being when forming or evaluating social
policies, one needs to use a social welfare function. Unfortunately, cases arise, where one
public policy does not dominate the others, and vice versa as in our quite general framework.
This means that there are some legitimate objective functions that would show that an
equilibrium, results in higher welfare than another equilibrium, and other legitimate objective
functions that would show exactly the opposite. Since it is impossible to rank them, we have
an incomplete ordering of alternative policies. In fact, well–being will grow as fiscal revenues
grow (if this leads to greater productive spending), and as the level of corruption decreases.
As there is no equilibrium that maximizes tax revenue with zero corruption, the State must
choose what, on the basis of its own preferences, is best for society:
• if the State wants to maximize tax revenues, it has to set the tax rate at t = t1. In
this case there is corruption in the economy;
• if the State wants to weed–out corruption, it has to set the tax rate at t = 0. In this
way there are no incentives to corruption. In such an equilibrium, the State does not
receive revenues and there is no space for financing public productive expenditure.
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If, on the other hand, the State chooses long term options, its policy objectives will be
to maximize growth, tax revenues and weed–out corruption. As we have said, the dynamic
revenues go hand in hand with the rate of growth: they are high, for low and for high rates
of tax, while corruption increases alongside the tax rate.
In a dynamic context, because γy(t = 0) > γy(t = 1), therefore there is an equilibrium
(t = 0) that maximizes growth rate with zero corruption, but also with zero tax revenues. If
the State sets low tax rate, then we obtain hight growth rate, low corruption and hight tax
revenues.
Tax revenues depend positively on economic growth in the sense that greater growth
implies, all the rest being equal, greater revenue and negatively on corruption in that greater
corruption implies all the rest being equal, lesser revenue. As the rate t grows initially, static
revenue grows and corruption grows but growth in corruption is lower than growth in tax
revenues, so accumulation reduces as economic growth does. Beyond a certain level, the
increase in rate implies an increase in corruption, that more than compensates for the higher
taxes paid by the honest entrepreneurs, so accumulation grows, as does economic growth.
5 Conclusions
The present paper provides a theoretical study of the problem of the optimal tax rate, in
the presence of corruption in a static and dynamic context. In the presence of taxation and
corruption, tax rate increases do not lead to lower revenues, provided that the tax rate is
lower than a given threshold. The greater the efficiency and pervasiveness of monitoring of
corruption, the greater the “inner honesty” of society and the lower the returns on investment
the higher the threshold that will be needed to depress revenues through a tax rate increase.
If one is willing to subscribe to the hypothesis that “Less Developed Countries” (LDC’s) have
poor monitoring institutions, less “inner honesty” and/or higher productivity of capital, then
it would appear that these countries would have a harder time to raise revenues. If revenues
are needed to stimulate the build–up of institutions and foster education, this points to the
possibility of a “poverty trap”, which has already been emphasized by some growth experts
(see Easterly, 2002). These conclusions are completely reversed in a dynamic framework, if
one is willing to subscribe to the basic tenet of our model that evasion among entrepreneurs
stimulates investment, accumulation and thereby growth. These conclusions should however
(with respect to existing literature) be understood as an additional recommendation for
lowering taxes on capital and/or investment, rather than stimulating evasion.
An empirical investigation of the implications of this model would allow us to find out,
whether indeed:
– for a given “inner honesty” of society, one can distinguish between high–growth
countries with extreme degrees of taxation and corruption, (either high taxation and
high corruption or low taxation and low corruption) and low–performance countries with
intermediate degrees of corruption and taxation. Similarly one could analyze the impact on
growth of evolution over time of taxation and corruption;
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– the degree of “inner honesty” of a country, if at all measurable, and leaving aside
the relevant issue of its endogeneity, affects the position of the “taxation–growth” curve.
Scandinavian countries are usually thought of as high–growth countries with high tax rate
and low corruption. While this may seem incompatible with the results of our model, it need
not be so, if one considers that these countries are also thought of as very transparent.14 If
indeed Scandinavian countries are empowered with a higher degree of “inner honesty”, they
may be characterized by a U–curve, (in the “tax rate–growth rate” space) shifted more to
the right. In this case a high tax rate may be compatible with high growth rate and low
corruption.
14For details, see Transparency International (TI). In the 2004 the CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) for
Finland is 9,7 (the country lesser corrupt in the TI ranking), 9,5 for Denmark, 9,2 for Sweden and 8,9 for
Norway. CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country
analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
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A Appendix: The Nash Bargaining bribe
Let pi∆ = pi4 − pi3 = pi(1)∆ , pi(2)∆ be the vector of the differences in the payoffs between the
case of agreement and disagreement about the bribe, between inspector and entrepreneur.
In accordance with generalized Nash bargaining theory, the division between two agents will
solve:
(43) max
b∈<+
[pi(1)∆ ]
β · [pi(2)∆ ]ε
in formula
(44) max
b∈<+
[ak(1− tq)− ckq − (1− q)b− ak(1− t)]β [w + (1− q)b− w]ε
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of pi∆ and where [(ak(1− t)), w]
is the point of disagreement, i.e. the payoffs that the entrepreneur and the inspector
respectively would obtain if they did not come to an agreement. The parameters β and
ε can be interpreted as measures of bargaining strength. It is now easy to check that the
tax inspector gets a share µ = εε+β of the surplus τ , i.e. the bribe is b = µτ . More generally
µ reflects the distribution of bargaining strength between two agents. The surplus τ is the
saving coming from not paying taxes, net of moral cost, that await the entrepreneur if he
found out: τ = akt− qck(1−q) .
Then the bribe bNB is an asymmetric (or generalized) Nash bargaining solution and is given
by:
(45) bNB = µ
[
akt− qkc)
(1− q)
]
that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, ∀q 6= 1.
B Appendix: Solution to the static game
Backward induction method. The static game is solved with the backward induction method,
which allows identification at the equilibria. Starting from stage 2, the entrepreneur needs
to decide whether to negotiate with the inspector. Both payoffs are then compared, because
the inspector asked for a bribe.
(2) At stage two the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if, and only if
(46) pi(1)4 ≥ pi(1)3 ⇒
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[
ak
[
1− t(1 + q)
2
]
− kqc
2
]
≥ ak(1− t)⇒
(47) t ≥ qc
a(1− q) = t
∗
(1) Going up the decision-making tree, at stage one the tax inspector decides whether to
ask for a positive bribe.
• Let t ≥ qca(1−q) = t∗ then the tax inspector knows that if he asks for a positive bribe,
the entrepreneur will accept the negotiation, and the final bribe will be bNB. Then at
stage one, the tax inspector asks for a bribe if, and only if
pi
(2)
4 > pi
(2)
2 ⇒
(48) w +
akt(1− q)
2
− qkc
2
> w
that is the tax inspector’s payoff. If asking for a positive bribe, is greater than his
payoff, if not asking the bribe:
(49) t ≥ qc
a(1− q) = t
∗
If t ≥ t∗, then tax inspector ask for the bribe bNB, that the entrepreneur will accept.
• Let t < qca(1−q) = t∗ then the tax inspector knows that the entrepreneurs will not
accept any possible bribe, so he will be honest and he will ask the entrepreneurs for
tax payment.
C Appendix: Solution to the dynamic game
In the equilibrium with corruption (equilibrium C), the entrepreneur’s profit is:
(50) ΠCI = ak
[
1− t(1 + q)
2
]
− kqci
2
thus the constraint is:
(51)
•
k = ak
[
1− t(1 + q)
2
]
− kqci
2
− C
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The Hamiltonian function is:
(52) H = e−ρt
C1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ
[
ak
[
1− t(1 + q)
2
]
− kqci
2
− C
]
where λ is a costate variable. Optimization provides the following first-order conditions:
(53) e−ρtC−σ − λ = 0
and
(54)
•
λ = −λ
[
a− at(1 + q)
2
− qci
2
]
By deriving the first condition (1) and substituting it into the second one (2), the
consumption growth rate is obtained:
(55) γCci =
1
σ
[
a− at(1 + q)
2
− qci
2
− ρ
]
In equilibrium NC, the entrepreneur’s profit is:
(56) ΠNCI = ak(1− t)
Thus the constraint is:
(57)
•
k = ak(1− t)− C
The Hamiltonian function is:
(58) H = e−ρt
C1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ[ak(1− t)− C]
Optimization provides the following first-order conditions that allow us to obtain the
consumer growth rate:
(59) γNC =
1
σ
[a(1− t)− ρ]
D Appendix: Aggregate growth
Aggregate growth γ is given by the sum of the rates of obtainable growth considered by
the number of entrepreneurs who are positioned in that equilibrium. Thus at equilibrium C
there will be (1− α) entrepreneurs, at equilibrium NC there will be (α) entrepreneurs.
At the equilibrium NC the growth rate
γNC =
1
σ
[a(1− t)− ρ]
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is independent of moral costs and will therefore be equal for each entrepreneur with moral
costs ci > c∗; at the equilibrium NC
γCi =
1
σ
[
a− at(1 + q)
2
− qci
2
− ρ
]
is dependent on moral costs for which reason each entrepreneur, with a moral cost of ci ≤ c∗,
will have a different growth rate. Thus
γ = (1− α) 1
σ
[
a− at(1 + q)
2
− ρ
]
− 1
2σ
[
q
∫ c∗
0
cidci
]
+
(60) +(α)
1
σ
[a(1− t)− ρ]
Substituting 1− α = at(1−q)q and after some simplifications we obtain:
(61) γ =
1
σ
[
a2t2(1− q)2
4q
+ a(1− t)− ρ
]
Deriving the aggregate growth rate γ with respect to the level of tax rate t, we obtain:
(62)
∂γ
∂t
=
a2t(1− q)2
2q
− a
Thus:
• γ(t) is decreasing or ∂γ∂t < 0 , when t < 2qa(1−q)2 ;
• γ(t) is minimal or ∂γ∂t = 0, when t = 2qa(1−q)2 ;
• γ(t) is growing or ∂γ∂t > 0, when t > 2qa(1−q)2 .
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